feat(android-terminal): Phase C — PIN screen with offline bcrypt verify
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Two-pane landscape: scrollable staff list on the left, PIN dots + numeric
keypad on the right. Footer shows online/offline + pending-sync count.
Going with cached-hashes for offline-capable PIN verify (decision logged
in chat). The threat model already accepts the device — a stolen tablet
holds a 1-year store-scoped JWT, so leaking 4-digit bcrypt hashes is
incremental. Hashes only ever leave the server when the requester is a
paired POS tablet, gated by the new endpoint refusing user JWTs.
Backend:
- GET /api/v1/store/loyalty/pins/for-device — returns PINs WITH pin_hash
for terminal-device JWTs only; user JWTs receive 403.
- PinForDeviceResponse / PinForDeviceListResponse schemas.
- 2 integration tests in TestPinsForDevice (10/10 pass total).
Android:
- PinForDeviceItem / PinForDeviceListResponse Moshi models.
- LoyaltyApi.listPinsForDevice().
- StaffPinRepository.verifyPin(plain) — at.favre.lib bcrypt verify
against cached hashes; filters active + unlocked rows in one pass.
- PendingTransactionDao.getPendingCount() switched to Flow<Int> so the
badge auto-updates when transactions sync.
- PinViewModel state machine — loads pins on init, accumulates digits,
bcrypt-verifies on length >= 4, fires verified/errorMessage. Combines
pending-sync count + online state into the same StateFlow.
- PinScreen rewrite: avatar-circle staff list, 6-dot PIN display,
spinner during verify, error label on wrong PIN, status footer.
Open follow-up (intentional, post-launch): tablet doesn't yet report
failed attempts back to the server's lockout counter. Path is clear —
small POST /pins/{id}/record-failed-attempt endpoint plus a call from
attemptVerify's failure branch.
Verified by ./gradlew assembleDebug — clean build.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ from app.modules.loyalty.schemas import (
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CardResponse,
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MerchantStatsResponse,
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PinCreate,
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PinForDeviceListResponse,
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PinForDeviceResponse,
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PinListResponse,
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PinResponse,
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PinUpdate,
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@@ -346,6 +348,47 @@ def list_pins(
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)
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@router.get("/pins/for-device", response_model=PinForDeviceListResponse)
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def list_pins_for_device(
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current_user: User = Depends(get_current_store_api),
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db: Session = Depends(get_db),
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):
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"""List staff PINs *with* their bcrypt ``pin_hash`` for offline verify.
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Reserved for paired POS tablets — the ``Authorization`` header must
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carry a device JWT. User JWTs are rejected with 403. Hashes only ever
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leave the server when the requester has been blessed by a merchant
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owner via the device pairing flow, and the device is the same source
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of truth that can be revoked from /merchants/loyalty/devices.
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"""
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if current_user.terminal_device_id is None:
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raise AuthorizationException(
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"This endpoint is only available to paired POS terminal devices"
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)
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store_id = current_user.token_store_id
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program = program_service.require_program_by_store(db, store_id)
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pins = pin_service.list_pins(db, program.id, store_id=store_id)
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return PinForDeviceListResponse(
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pins=[
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PinForDeviceResponse(
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id=p.id,
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name=p.name,
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staff_id=p.staff_id,
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is_active=p.is_active,
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is_locked=p.is_locked,
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locked_until=p.locked_until,
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last_used_at=p.last_used_at,
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created_at=p.created_at,
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pin_hash=p.pin_hash,
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)
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for p in pins
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],
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total=len(pins),
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)
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@router.post("/pins", response_model=PinResponse, status_code=201)
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def create_pin(
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data: PinCreate,
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@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ from app.modules.loyalty.schemas.pin import (
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PinCreateForMerchant,
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PinDetailListResponse,
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PinDetailResponse,
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PinForDeviceListResponse,
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PinForDeviceResponse,
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PinListResponse,
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PinResponse,
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PinUpdate,
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@@ -135,6 +137,8 @@ __all__ = [
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"PinCreateForMerchant",
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"PinUpdate",
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"PinResponse",
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"PinForDeviceResponse",
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"PinForDeviceListResponse",
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"PinDetailResponse",
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"PinListResponse",
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"PinDetailListResponse",
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@@ -99,6 +99,23 @@ class PinDetailListResponse(BaseModel):
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total: int
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class PinForDeviceResponse(PinResponse):
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"""Pin response for a paired terminal device.
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Includes the bcrypt ``pin_hash`` so the tablet can verify a typed
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PIN locally without a network round-trip. This shape is ONLY served
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by the device-only endpoint (``GET /pins/for-device``) — every other
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pin endpoint stays hash-less.
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"""
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pin_hash: str
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class PinForDeviceListResponse(BaseModel):
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pins: list[PinForDeviceResponse]
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total: int
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class PinVerifyRequest(BaseModel):
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"""Schema for verifying a staff PIN."""
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@@ -257,3 +257,55 @@ class TestActingDeviceAudit:
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)
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assert tx is not None
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assert tx.acting_terminal_device_id is None
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@pytest.mark.integration
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@pytest.mark.api
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@pytest.mark.loyalty
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class TestPinsForDevice:
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"""GET /pins/for-device exposes hashes only to paired devices."""
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def test_device_token_receives_hashes(
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self, client, loyalty_merchant_headers, loyalty_store_setup, db
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):
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from app.modules.loyalty.models import StaffPin
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store = loyalty_store_setup["store"]
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program = loyalty_store_setup["program"]
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pin = StaffPin(
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merchant_id=store.merchant_id,
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program_id=program.id,
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store_id=store.id,
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name="Test Cashier",
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staff_id="cash01",
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)
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pin.set_pin("4321")
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db.add(pin)
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db.commit()
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db.refresh(pin)
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paired = client.post(
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f"{MERCHANT_BASE}/devices",
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json={"store_id": store.id, "label": "PIN test"},
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headers=loyalty_merchant_headers,
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).json()
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token = paired["setup_token"]
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response = client.get(
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f"{STORE_BASE}/pins/for-device",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
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payload = response.json()
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assert payload["total"] >= 1
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target = next(p for p in payload["pins"] if p["id"] == pin.id)
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assert target["pin_hash"].startswith("$2") and len(target["pin_hash"]) > 50
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def test_user_token_is_rejected(
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self, client, loyalty_store_headers
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):
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response = client.get(
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f"{STORE_BASE}/pins/for-device",
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headers=loyalty_store_headers,
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)
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assert response.status_code == 403, response.text
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